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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

[REDACTED]
23 August 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America

SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
August 1985

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1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 21 August 1985.

2. NICARAGUA

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WARNING ISSUES: If insurgent forces maintain their current momentum, the Sandinistas are likely to respond with a greater effort. This might well include a larger and more direct Cuban participation in direct combat with the insurgents.

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3. GUYANA

President Hugh Desmond Hoyte's succession to power has been orderly and uneventful thus far. Prime Minister Hamilton Green has supported the President, apparently content to wait for his turn at power at some future time. The indications are that the Guyanese government may move toward a more moderate (or at least less radical) position both domestically and internationally.

- The left-wing of the PNC believes that Hoyte and Green intend to remove most of the leftist ideologues now in the government.
- Most of these individuals represent channels of influence for the USSR/Cuba.
- In order to demonstrate their more moderate orientation, Hoyte and Green might decide not to go ahead with the agreement to acquire Soviet helicopters.
- Cheddi Jagan and his opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) now have even less chance of gaining a meaningful share of power. The talks for a coalition government will probably drag on without offering the PPP any real concessions.

Thus far the Guyanese government has not signaled any intention to improve relations with the United States, but such overtures are likely.

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4. PERU

There is no doubt that the USSR intends to offer President Garcia more economic and military assistance at attractive terms in an effort to expand its influence in Peru.

- Garcia will probably accept increased trade and aid projects, especially as the terms are likely to be favorable, i.e., repayment can be made in "non-traditional" goods, such as fish meal.
- In order to retain the support of the Peruvian military forces, the President will go on accepting Soviet equipment which is offered at generous terms.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this will lead to any real influence or leverage over President Garcia in the international arena.

- Garcia intends to take a Third World, non-aligned position with a north vs. south orientation. If other countries were to match Soviet terms, President Garcia would probably switch in order to underscore his non-alignment.
- In order to establish his credibility, he must keep his distance from the Soviet Union.

However, Garcia's options to Soviet aid are limited given Peru's dire economic condition, and he may accept Soviet offers to accept repayment by channeling assistance to Nicaragua.

WARNING ISSUES: Will the USSR be able to increase its influence in Peru by means of more favorable economic terms and assistance to the Garcia government?

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5. CHILE

President Pinochet seems determined to ride out the current spate of demonstrations and bombings that are intended to pressure him into relaxing his harsh policies and speed up the transition to civilian rule. The radicals continue to use violent tactics in an effort to bring about the reimposition of a state-of-siege. This would not only have a polarizing effect domestically, but would also have a damaging impact on the Pinochet government internationally. If a state-of-siege were imposed, some members of the military high command might begin to re-examine their support for Pinochet.

- Opposition forces, including both moderates and radicals, are cooperating in the demonstrations.
- The moderates have attempted to convince the radicals to give up the bombings without success.
- The Communists are increasing their commitment to the armed struggle; however, they do not represent a serious challenge to the security forces at this time. US facilities/personnel do not appear to be a primary target.

If Pinochet is removed, he would most likely be replaced by an Army General. General Canessa, Vice Commander of the Army, is the likeliest contender even though he is past retirement age.

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DIA: DIO/DIA
DIAC/DE-3
DIAC/DB3C2
JSI-4B
AT-5
OS-1B

Department of the Air Force (Intelligence)

Office of Naval Intelligence

National Security Agency

Vice President's Office

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 33- D/OIA (Room [redacted])
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